Summary of the overall effectiveness of the agreements concluded Step by step Explanation of how agreements are developed and implemented According to the opinion of all agreements, their objectives and results A model of agent-in-principle (P-A) is used to analyze the effects of environmental performance, primary management, the use of imperfect performance indicators and the fear of penalizing environmental damage, in order to avoid environmental damage and to encourage agents (handling of hazardous substances personnel) to take appropriate action. To motivate the agent, the client proposes an incentive contract based on environmental responsibility (measured by the EPI). Environmental responsibility that is difficult to measure due to the high uncertainty associated with the EPI hinders the implementation of an effective P-A treaty. . This is an overview of the content of the subscription, log in to check access. Russel, C. S., W. Harrington and W. J. Vaughan (1986), Enforcing Pollution Control Laws. Washington: resources for the future.
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